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Abstract
This paper investigates the eﬀect of poverty and good intentions
on dictator game giving. Previous experimental studies in which in-
formation was supplied to dictators about recipients have shown that
dictator giving increases overall in this context. We develop a new
design of standard informed dictator games with three main variants:
1) three recipients are used instead of one; 2) dictators are informed
that their recipients are poor; 3) dictators give donations in the form
of medicines instead of money. We have found that 46% of the exper-
imental subjects (dictators) give the full amount of money (100% of
the endowment) in the ‘poverty’ treatment, while in the ‘medicines’
treatment this percentage increases to 72%. Such extremely gener-
ous behavior has seldom been observed in the previous literature on
dictator games.
Keywords: dictator giving, poverty eﬀect, good intentions eﬀect,
medicines.
JEL Class.: C90, C91, D63, D64.
1 Introduction
Why do people give so little in dictator games? Could it be that they are
not suﬃciently motivated?
∗Special thanks to Fernando Aguiar, Virtudes Alba, Victoria Ateca, Jordi Brandts,
Enrique Fatás, Nikolaos Georgantzís, Rosario Gómez, Francisca Jiménez, Francisco Lagos,
Antonio J. Morales and the participants at the II Workshop on Individual Decision Making
(Málaga, 2003) for their comments and suggestions on both the design and the preliminary
drafts of this paper; also to Martha Gaustad who revised english grammar. The author
would also like to thank the Institute for Advanced Social Studies (IESA/CSIC) for their
hospitality and financial support; also partial finantial support by centrA: is acknowledged.
†Address: Pablo Brañas-Garza. Instituto de Estudios Sociales Avanzados, IESA-CSIC.
Camposanto de los Mártires, 7, 14004, Córdoba (Spain). email: pbg@ujaen.es; phone: 00-
34-957-760260.
2
In “anonymous” dictator games1 (hereafter DG) — those in which the
dictator has no information regarding the characteristics of the recipient (see
Hoﬀman, McCabe, Shachat & Smith, [13] or Hoﬀman, McCabe & Smith,
[12]- hereafter HMS) — voluntary contributions tend to be low, around 10%
of the pie on average. This lack of generosity has been attributed to the
anonymity of social distance, which discourages altruistic behavior.
However, in dictator games where information is supplied about recipi-
ents, the results are not much diﬀerent. For example, in Burham [4], where
dictators viewed a picture of recipients, only 25% of subjects gave half the
endowment! What is even more surprising is that 58% kept the full amount
for themselves (see Table A.1, Appendix). In Eckel & Grossman [8], where
the recipient was the Red Cross, only 17% gave half, 10% gave all and 27%
gave nothing!
According to Frohlich, Oppenheimer & Moore [10], the lack of generosity
is due to the fact that subjects do not believe the veracity of the experiment.
To put it another way, subjects have reasonable doubts as to who will receive
the money and whether or not the recipient does, in fact, exist. Frohlich et al.
designed two experiments in which subjects were able to see their recipients.
Their results indicated that this setting led to increased donations: 26%
of the subjects in treatment 1 and 35% in treatment 2 donated half their
endowment. Moreover, in Charness & Gneezy [6], subjects were told the
name of their recipients. Surprisingly, 40% of subjects gave their recipients
half of the endowment!
Until now, none of the experiments with informed dictators have attained
sound results in terms of donations. In the studies by Burnham and Frohlich
et al., average donations account for about 20% of the pie, while in Char-
ness & Gneezy and Eckel & Grossman donations are close to 30%. We are,
therefore, still very far from reaching a fair division of the pie.
It is interesting to note that the most recent theoretical studies on altru-
ism (the studies by Ferh & Schmidt [9] or Charness & Rabin [5] are obvious
examples) consider inequity aversion to play a very important role in generous
behavior. Moreover, Andreoni & Miller [1] argue that the social attributes
of the game motivate generosity2.
1The Dictator Game is a very simple game with two players. Player i (the dictator)
must divide the pie between himself and player −i (the recipient). The dictator may divide
the pie in the manner he sees fit, while the recipient may not make any claim to the money.
Theoretically, the solution is obvious: player i keeps all and player −i receives nothing.
2The utility function proposed in this paper is:
Ui = Ui(πi, π−i; γ) (1)
where πi (π−i) denotes payoﬀs by player i (−i) and γ game (social) attributes.
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However, in the absence of information about players’ incomes, inequity
aversion is limited to the payoﬀ, that is, to unfair divisions. In this context,
the social attributes of the game are limited, especially when taking into
account the amounts given in this type of game: $10.
But what happens when information is given about the recipients’ (low)
level of income? How will dictators act when they know that their recipient
is poor?
Previous experiments have not delved into this line of research; an issue
which is of obvious importance in real donations made to poor countries.
Thus the objective of our study is to examine this question. With this aim,
we propose an experimental design in which the subjects (dictators) know
that the recipients are communities from poor countries. They do not know,
however, either the name or the location of the country. In order to further
reinforce inequity aversion, we use three recipients instead of one. Hence,
each dictator must simultaneously divide the pie among three recipients.
Finally, donations are restricted to giving the full endowment or nothing to
each of the recipients.
Our research combines real and hypothetical experiments and, as will
be seen, no diﬀerences are observed between them. Three treatments of a
multi-recipient DG design are used in which divisions are restricted. The first
treatment is a ‘no-info’ treatment in which no information is given about the
recipient; the second is the ‘poverty’ treatment which includes information
about the recipient’s income (he is poor); and the third is the ‘medicines’
treatment in which dictators are informed that donations will be sent in the
form of medicines and not money.
The experimental results are as follows: in the ‘no-info’ treatment (treat-
ment 1) average donations are 10% of the total, similar to what has been
observed in other experiments. In the ‘poverty’ treatment (treatment 2) av-
erage donations increased to 66% of the total, a result that has not been
previously observed in informed dictator games. Finally, in the ‘medicines’
treatment (treatment 3), we attain an average donation of 80% of the total
endowment!
In Section 2 the motivation and design of the experiment is discussed.
The results of the study are examined in Section 3 while conclusions are
reached in Section 4.
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2 Motivation, Design & Protocol
2.1 Motivation
Previous papers on informed dictator games3 have focused on reinforcing re-
cipients’ existence, pro-social behavior or reducing social isolation. When
comparing the results of these papers to those found by HMS, an increas-
ing level of generosity is observed, although anonymity requirements remain
unaltered.
With the exception of Eckel & Grossman [8], who obtain intermediate
findings in terms of donations, none of the previous papers have focused on
social dilemmas. Following the theoretical contributions of Fehr and Schmidt
[9] and Andreoni & Miller [1], we propose an alternative DG design — the
Poverty Dictator Game- that takes into account social attributes. Specifi-
cally, we inform the dictator that his rival is poor: a community from an
undeveloped country.
When comparing this treatment with the baseline (no-info) treatment we
expected to find an increasing level of donations. This variation will be called
the Poverty effect.
Once the poverty eﬀect is verified, in the third version of the design
(the ‘medicines’ treatment) dictators are informed that their money will be
donated in the form of medicines. As Frohlich et al. [10] points out, subjects
do not believe that the recipient will actually receive the money they have
donated. Outside of the lab, in the real world, people doubt that donations
really help much, because a non-negligible part of the money disappears along
the way. In our treatment, however, the money was given a specific purpose:
to buy medicines. By doing so, we expect to motivate generosity; an eﬀect
we will call the Good Intentions effect.
In short, we conjectured that by including poverty and medicine condi-
tions, the standard DG would be transformed into a social dilemma, placing
individual preferences in confrontation with other-regarding preferences and
thereby increasing dictator giving.
In the absence of information about partner’s income, both altruism and
inequity aversion could deviate the Nash solution towards an egalitarian divi-
sion of the pie. Recall that in HMS this highly generous behavior is extremely
rare, although in the case of informed dictator games this fair division occurs
somewhat more often. However, unequal divisions of the pie to the recipi-
ent’s advantage are rarely observed. We think that the use of poverty — that
is, giving information about player −i income - not only motivates altruism
3Other studies include those by Charness et al. [7] and Bohnet & Frey [3].
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and inequity aversion, but social welfare criteria as well.
When using individual income rather than pure payoﬀs (where i player
has mi income and −i player has m−i income) the individual utility function
is:
Ui = Ui(mi + πi,m−i + π−i) (2)
Let define w = w(mi,m−i) =mi−m−i as the diﬀerence betweenmi versus
m−i. For positive values of w (w > 0) it would be sensible to assume that
player i (dictator) will donate some of his money if he has any social welfare
criteria. When dictators are informed that their recipients are poor they not
only know that w > 0 but also realize that w → ∞. In this case dictators
with other-regarding preferences may give the full amount of money to their
rivals. Note that if dictators have no information about their partners they
could suppose that m−i+ π−i ' mi+ πi. In this case, only inequity aversion
(on payoﬀs) or pure altruism would explain donations.
In sum, the use of poverty reinforces the social dilemma involved in dic-
tator games.
2.2 Design
To study the eﬀect of poverty on dictators’ donations a dictator experiment
was designed with three variants on the standard DG. The same basic struc-
ture was used in all the treatments with the exception of the information
given to the subjects. The basic structure of the experiment is described
in the first subsection below and the information is explained in the second
subsection.
2.2.1 Basic Structure
bs1: Introduction: Individuals were invited to participate in an investi-
gation about the distribution of non-divisible and finite commodities.
As examples we used the allocation of one airport when three cities
claim it; the building site for a bridge when there are several possible
locations; or the distribution of human organs when several patients
request them.
Note that the word ‘experiment’ was not used. As Frohlich et al. points
out, when experimental subjects view the DG as a game they behave as play-
ers and go to the lab to earn money. To avoid this problem, the experimental
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subjects were not recruited publicly, instead the experimenter visited their
classes to run an investigation.
bs2: Subjects received three 5C= bills each (15C= total).
5C= bills were used instead of 1C= coins to constrain subjects’ donations.
Although we conjectured that this modification would increase donations,
Bolton, Katok & Zwick (2 cards-1 game treatment) [2] obtained the opposite
results when “bills” were used4.
bs3: Instructions: (1) You should divide this amount of money among three
identical recipients (r1, r2, r3) and yourself; (2) none of the recipients
can receive more than 5C=; (3) any assignment - except that which vio-
lates rule 2 - is allowed, including keeping all of the money for yourself
and leaving nothing to the recipients.
Why three identical recipients? We use three partners in order to motivate
egalitarian rules. If the subject follows these rules he is forced to choose
between selfish but egalitarian behavior (leaving zero to each one) or complete
altruism (leaving 5C= to each one and keeping zero for himself). Using a
repeated DG (2 cards-10 game treatment), Bolton et al. observe an increasing
level of donations throughout the game. Our hypothesis is that if individuals
are inequity averse, they should increase their donations when the number
of recipients is larger.
2.2.2 Info Conditions
Although all three treatments share the same basic structure (bs1 to bs3),
they diﬀer in the type of information dictators receive about recipients. Al-
though there are no diﬀerences between recipients 1, 2 and 3 in each treat-
ment, three distinct information profiles are used across treatments.
[i1] ‘No-info’ treatment: No information is given about recipients (like HMS)
[i2] ‘Poverty’ treatment: Dictators are informed that their recipients are
poor (i.e. from communities in underdeveloped countries)5.
[i3] ‘Medicines’ treatment: poverty condition + dictators are informed about
the purpose of their donations: medicines.
4In Bolton’s et al. experiment, subjects were faced with two possible scenarios: $10/$0
(leaving zero to the recipient) or $5/$5 (equal division). Note that in both cases the
dictator always received at least $5. Therefore, his decision was either to earn $5 plus or
to pass it on to the recipient. In this study, 93% of the dictators kept all the money for
themselves.
5As explained above, this type of information is not neutral. Subjects know that the
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2.3 Protocol
In order to reduce the cost of the study, the research was performed in two
parallel settings: an economic experiment with monetary incentives at the
University of Cordoba, Spain; and a hypothetical questionnaire without any
monetary rewards (survey) at the University of Jaén (100 km from the Uni-
versity of Cordoba). In both cases business students comprised the subject
pool. The experiment was conducted in November 2002 and the survey in
May 2003. Seventy-five observations were made in the first experiment and
138 in the second one.
2.3.1 The Economic Experiment
The experiment was run in two rooms with group 1 (40 experimental sub-
jects) and group 2 (37 subjects). In each room subjects were asked to sit
apart at the end of their row. When all the students were seated they were
given an envelope. The envelope contained intructions, three 5C= bills, a
questionnaire, a sheet with three numerical codes (their recipients) and, fi-
nally, a small envelope to leave their donations in. Each group was publicly
informed that one individual had received an empty envelope in order to
reinforce anonymity6. Instructions were explained orally.
In this experiment we used the basic instructions (bs1 to bs3) with the
i3 information profile [poverty + drugs]. Thus, dictators were informed
that their recipients were poor (communities from underdeveloped countries)
and that their donations would be sent to those destinations in the form of
medicines, not cash.
When the subjects finished assigning their donations they were asked to
place their small envelope in an urn and leave the room. No personal data
was required with the exception of gender.
The entire amount of money given by the dictators (855 C=) was donated
to an international medical NGO. This information was not made public.
recipient exists, (see Frohlich et al.) thus imbuing the game with a social dimension in the
following two manners:
1. Subjects know that the recipient needs the money, reinforcing not only inequity
aversion and altruism but social welfare criteria as well.
2. The use of labels such as ‘poverty’, ‘underdeveloped countries’ or ‘medicines’ - in-
duces the dictator to remember past experiences, TV images and so on. (see HMS,
also Eckel & Grossman.
6This is why we have 75 observations rather than 77. Individuals who received an
empty envelope were paid 10C=.
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2.3.2 The Hypothetical Experiment
The survey was conducted in four rooms. To perform the survey, we asked the
whole population to conduct all the treatments (dictator game with info 1,
info 2 and info 3). In order to assess any “rank eﬀect”, diﬀerent combinations
of the info conditions were used. With this aim, each group received the
information profile in a diﬀerent order. Table 1 summarizes the distribution
of treatments by groups:
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4
round 1 no-info drug no-info poverty
round 2 poverty no-info drug drug
round 3 drug poverty poverty no-info
n n1=30 n2=39 n3=35 n4=34
Table 1: Treatment Order by Group (Survey)
In each room, as in the economic experiment, subjects were placed in
separate rows. When all of them were seated, they received an envelope with
the basic instructions (bs1 to bs3) and three decision sheets. Instructions
were then explained orally.
After this, dictators were informed about the first info condition (no-info
for group 1, medicines for group 2, etc., see table 1). When all of them had
filled out decision sheet 1, the second info condition (poverty for group 1, no-
info for group 2, etc.) was explained. Finally, the third condition (medicines
for group 1, poverty for group 2, etc.) was explained.
When they had finished the third and last round, the subjects were asked
to put their decision sheets in the envelope and leave it in the urn. As in the
economic experiment, no personal data, except gender, was collected.
3 Results
In this section, the results obtained in each treatment are analyzed, that is,
no-info, poverty and medicines. The variable studied here is Dictator Giving:
the amount of money that the dictator donates to the recipients. References
are also made to the division of the pie. Before presenting these results, we
propose the following classification of potential generous behaviors.
Let us define D as the total size of the pie; d−i as the money that the
dictator gives to players −i, and di as the money he keeps for himself. Hence:
di + d−i = D. Individual behavior is classified as follows:
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Definition 1 Purely selfish individuals: Subjects who keep the full amount
of money for themselves, that is, d−i = 0 (or di = D).
Definition 2 Generous individuals: Subjects who keep a larger portion of
the endowment for themselves (di > d−i > 0).
Definition 3 Hyper-fair individuals7: Subjects who divide the pie in favor of
the recipient but keep some amount of money for themselves (d−i > di > 0).
Definition 4 Altruistic individuals: Subjects who donate the whole pie (di =
0 or d−i = D).
Results are summarized in Tables 3 A, B and C and Figure 1. Recall that
we have both experimental and hypothetical data. We used non-parametric
tests to check if the data collected from the diﬀerent surveys (including the
economic experiments) were drawn from the same population. If confirmed,
we are able to merge samples and reach conclusions for each treatment. For-
tunately, this was the case.
3.1 No-Info Condition: Results from Questionnaires
The design used herein diﬀers with respect to HMS anonymity experiments.
Given that our modifications (bs1 to bs3, subsection 2.2.1.) could have an
eﬀect on the donations, the baseline treatment was used as a control. No
information about partners was provided in this treatment.
According to our results, more than 25% of the subjects (30 to 128)
behaved as hyper-fair or altruistic individuals in the ‘no-info’ treatment, do-
nating 10 or 15C= to their recipients. However, “talk is free” when real money
is not involved - as in our hypothetical experiment. Hence we conjectured
that these subjects behaved kindly towards their experimenter and decided
to delete them from the sample. Consequently, the population sample was
reduced to 98 subjects for all the treatments.
Table 2 illustrates dictators’ donations by group. Column 1 shows the
possible donation amounts (15C=, 10C=, 5C= or 0C=). Columns 4-7 show the
number of subjects per donation in each group. The Kruskal-Wallis non-
parametric test for k-unrelated samples indicates that there is no diﬀerence
in distribution across groups8, meaning that all four groups are drawn from
7I take this definition from Gintis et al. [11].
8This test is adequate for k unrelated samples. It uses the null hypothesis:
H0 : µ1 = µ2 = ... = µk.
When H0 is not rejected, the k samples are drawn from the same population.
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the same population and we are entitled to merge samples. Hence, in this
treatment, no rank-eﬀect is observed.
Total By Groups
d−i Freq. % gr.1 gr.2 gr.3 gr.4
15 0 0 0 0 0 0
10 0 0 0 0 0 0
5 28 28, 6 6 9 7 6
0 70 71, 4 18 19 14 19
N 98 ni 24 28 21 25
Mean 1,43 s.d. 2,27
Median 0 Kruskal-Wallis χ23=0,806
Mode 0 p-value=0,84
Table 2: Donations in No-Info Treatment
Column 2 shows the descriptive statistics and frequencies for the whole
sample. The average donation in the ‘no-info’ treatment is 1.43C= (out of
a total of 15C=). Thus, on average, dictators donate less than 10% of their
endowment.
The results obtained using the basic structure (bs1 to bs3) and the ‘no-
info’ profile (i1) are similar to those reported in HMS. Note that subjects who
behave extremely generously have been deleted from the sample in order to
fit these findings to those reported in previous papers.
From this point on, only purely selfish and generous subjects (see previous
classification) were used in treatment 1 to study the eﬀect of poverty and good
intentions on the pie division.
According to many authors, such as Frochlich et al., the selfish or unequal
division of the pie by the dictator may be explained by the lack of information
about the recipient. When dictators do not know to whom they are giving
their money, the credibility of the experiment diminishes. Furthermore, in
the absence of information about recipients, generous behavior is not hardly
motivated (see Eckel & Grossman).
This issue will be explored in depth in the subsection below.
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3.2 The Poverty Condition: Results from Question-
naires
As explained above, the ‘poverty’ treatment is similar to the previous treat-
ment, with the exception that information is provided to the dictator regard-
ing recipients’ poverty.
Table 3 and Figure 1 refer to informed dictator giving. The Kruskal-Wallis
test indicates that all four subsamples were drawn from the same population
and have the same distribution. No rank-eﬀect was observed.
On average, dictators donate two-thirds of the pie (9.24C=). Surprisingly,
40% of the dictators give the full endowment to their recipients, meaning
that close to 40% of the population is altruistic. Furthermore, dictators
who donate a larger amount of money than they keep for themselves (hyper-
fair plus altruistic subjects) account for 66,3% of the sample. Thus, two-
thirds of the population divide the pie in an unequal manner to benefit the
recipients when they are informed about the recipient’s poverty condition!
Consequently, less than one-fourth of the population behave as purely selfish
individuals.
When comparing these results to the results of the ‘no-info’ treatment,
the ‘poverty eﬀect’ (see Figure 1) becomes quite obvious. In order to make
a cross comparison of the treatments, diﬀerences among distributions were
checked using non-parametric tests for related samples. Table A2 (appendix)
illustrates the analysis of dependences across treatments. Both the Signs and
Wilcoxon tests reject (p − value < 0.01) the null hypothesis of same distri-
bution, suggesting treatment eﬀect. As shown, when information about the
recipients’ poverty is provided, dictators significantly increase their dona-
tions.
Result 1: The use of the poverty condition leads dictators to divide the pie
unfairly to the benefit of the recipients.
With the exception of Frohlich et al. and Eckel & Grossman, who re-
spectively report that 5% and 10% of dictators donate the full endowment
(see FOM1-01 and EG-96, table A1 appendix), there is no record of subjects
donating the entire endowment in the literature on informed dictator games.
Result 2: Compared to the previous literature, the percentage of altruistic
dictators notably increases under the poverty condition. Therefore, the
number of subjects whose behavior is purely selfish drops significantly
(22%).
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Total By Groups
d−i Freq. % gr.1 gr.2 gr.3 gr.4
15 40 40, 8 9 11 9 11
10 25 25, 5 8 6 6 5
5 11 11, 2 2 5 1 3
0 22 22, 4 5 6 5 6
N 98 ni 24 28 21 25
Mean 9,24 s.d. 5.9
Median 10 Kruskal-Wallis χ23=0,126
Mode 15 p-value=0,98
Table 3: Donations in Poverty Treatment
Why do subjects become generous under the poverty eﬀect? Figure 1
shows the eﬀect of poverty on dictator giving. Note that the players we
analyzed in the ‘no-info’ treatment behaved selfishly, yet in the ‘poverty’
treatment the entire population clearly became more generous. This would
seem to suggest that the ‘poverty’ label reinforces not only inequity aversion
and altruism but also social welfare goals. Furthermore, as this generous
behavior was shown by originally selfish subjects, we conjecture that poverty
not only leads to increased donations but encourages generosity as well.
3.3 Medicines Condition: Results from the Question-
naires and Experiments
The aim of the last treatment is to study how dictators’ behavior varies when
they know: i) a concrete characteristic of the recipient (e.g. that he is poor)
and ii) how the money is used (e.g. to buy medicines).
This variation is not trivial. Subjects know where their money is going
and are therefore able to judge if the purpose to which it shall be put is
appropriate or not. Our design diﬀers from that of Eckel & Grossman along
two dimensions: 1) we do not identify any particular organization; and 2)
the purpose of the money is known: to buy medicines.
The results of this treatment are shown in Table 4 and Figure 1. Note
that both survey and experimental results are used for the treatment; recall
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that subsamples 1 to 4 come from the surveys, while subsamples 5 and 6
refer to the experimental sessions. The Kruskal-Wallis test does not reject
the null hypothesis of same distribution for our 4 surveys —KW(S)— and for
our 6 samples —surveys + experiments, KW(X). Hence, all six subsamples
are drawn from the same population and no rank-eﬀect is observed.
0
0,25
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0,75
1
15 € 10 € 5 € 0 €
d-i
P
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ul
at
io
n 
(%
)
No-Info Poverty Medicines
Figure 1: Acummulated frequencies by treatments.
If the experimental results share the same distribution as the survey ob-
servations, it is legitimate to compare the results of this treatment with
previous ones.
On average, dictators keep less than 10% of the money for themselves.
The use of medicines instead of money leads to overall increased generosity.
Furthermore, the number of subjects (altruistic individuals) who donated
the full endowment is overwhelming, some 71%.
The analysis of dependences across treatments reveals that treatments 2
and 3 are not drawn from the same population. Both the Signs and Wilcoxon
tests reject (p − value < 0.01) the null hypothesis of same distribution.
Table A2 (appendix) illustrates these tests and other possible combinations,
demonstrating that there is treatment eﬀect. The combination of poverty
with medicines modifies behavior with respect to poverty alone.
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Recall that in the ‘poverty’ treatment the percentage of altruistic dictators
was 40% (vs. 71% in the ‘medicines’ treatment). In this treatment, the
average donation increased from 65% to 90% of the endowment, while the
number of selfish individuals declined from 22% to 5,8% (10/173 subjects)
(see Figure 1).
Result 3: When dictators know that their money will be spent on medici-
nes, on average, they do not divide the pie equally.
Result 4: Under the ‘good-intention’ eﬀect the percentage of altruist dicta-
tors is overwhelming and the number of selfish dictators is insignificant.
Total By Groups Experiments
d−i Freq. % gr.1 gr.2 gr.3 gr.4 Exp.1 Exp.2
15 123 71, 1 18 16 14 19 29 27
10 27 15, 6 2 9 5 2 5 4
5 13 7, 5 1 2 1 1 4 4
0 10 5, 8 3 1 1 3 1 1
N 173 ni 24 28 21 25 39 36
Mean 12,35 s.d. 4,60
Med. 15 K-W(S) χ23=1,43 K-W(X). χ25=2,28
Mode 15 p-val.=0.98 p-val.=0.80
Table 4: Donations in Medicines Treatment
Why? My personal view is that greater confidence is gained when subjects
know that a specific need will be met by their giving. When subjects are
informed that their donations will be used for a determined purpose they are
reassured that their money will be spent appropriately, thus engendering less
doubts.
In our case, subjects know that the money will be used to buy medicines.
Hence, not only is there is no doubt as to how their money will be spent, but
the vast majority of the population approves this use of their money. That
is what we call the ‘good-intentions’ eﬀect.
Frohlich et al. argues that a large percentage of selfish behavior observed
in previous research is caused by a lack of confidence as dictators not only
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have doubts as to the existence of recipients, but how the money will be
spent. Our paper seems to confirm this argument. Therefore, as Eckel &
Grossman have suggested, the use of the ‘poverty’ label seems to reinforce
generosity.
4 Conclusions
In recent years the number of experimental and theoretical papers devoted
to the study of generous behavior has risen significantly. Theoretical con-
tributions have focused on inequity aversion, reciprocity and pure altruism
to explain deviations from the Nash prediction. Although experimental re-
search has used several games to examine generosity, the Dictator Game is,
unquestionably, the most important reference for this phenomenon.
Few experimental dictator games provide dictators with information re-
garding recipients, although experimental studies suggest that when infor-
mation is supplied, dictator giving increases. Hence, our study is an eﬀort
to follow up on this line of research.
Our dictator game is designed to include multiple recipients, 5C= bills
instead of 1C= coins and three information profiles about recipients. The
three information profiles comprise a ‘baseline’ treatment (no-info condition)
in which no information is supplied about the recipient, a ‘poverty’ treatment
indicating that the recipient is poor, and a final treatment in which subjects
are informed that the recipient is not only poor but that donations will be
sent in the form of medicines instead of money.
Our results indicate that both poverty and good intentions aﬀect the
way in which the dictator chooses to divide the pie. A comparison of the
treatment findings show that:
• The number of selfish individuals decreases across treatments: 71, 4%
(T1), 22, 4% (T2), 5, 8% (T3)
• The number of altruistic subjects increases across treatments: 0% (T1),
40% (T2), 71% (T3)
• Average donations also increase across treatments: 28% (T1), 65% (T2),
90% (T3)
Consequently, we do believe that in order to motivate generous behavior
it is not only recommendable to inform dictators about recipients’ income,
but also to specify what the money will be spent on. Nevertheless, poverty
seems to have a greater eﬀect on dictator giving.
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Appendix
Info on Dictator Giving
Recipient 0% 1%− 49% 50% 51%− 99% 100%
HMSS-94 – 64% 28% 5% 3% 0%
HMS-REP – 58% 33% 8% 0% 0%
EG-96 Red Cross 27% 42% 17% 4% 10%
CG-01 Name 27% 30% 40% 3% 0%
FOM2-01 Existence 35% 24% 35% 6% 0%
FOM1-01 Colleague 48% 26% 26% 0% 5%
B-03 Photo 58% 17% 25% 0% 0%
Table A1: Designs & Results
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2 samples test: Poverty Drugs
Wilcoxon No-Info Z = −7, 61∗ Z = −8, 70∗
Signs No-Info Z = −7, 32∗ Z = −9, 80∗
Wilcoxon Poverty −− Z = −4, 34∗
Signs Wilcoxon −− Z = −4, 64∗
K samples test: No-Info vs. Poverty vs. Drugs
Friedman χ22=138.9*
W-Kendall χ22=138.9*
(∗)p− value < 0, 01
Table A2: Differences among Treatments
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